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Abstract
Empirical studies show that female workers are under-represented in highest hierarchical
positions of companies, which is known as the glass-ceiling effect. In this study we investigate
the relationship between social networks and the glass-ceiling effect. Specifically, we develop
an equilibrium search and matching model where job ladders consist of three hierarchical
levels and social networks are generated endogenously. Male and female workers move up
in the hierarchical ladder via job-to-job transitions between firms and internal promotions
within firms. They also accumulate experience which is a necessary requirement for applying
to jobs in the highest hierarchical level. Open vacancies can be filled by formal matching
of applicants to jobs or by referrals, which implies that senior workers recommend their
social contacts for the job. Social networks exhibit gender homophily, which reflects the
fact that social ties are more likely to be formed between workers of the same gender. In
a setting when female workers are the minority, there are too few female contacts in the
social networks of their male colleagues. This disadvantage implies that female workers
are refereed less often for the jobs and under-represented in senior hierarchical positions of
firms. We show that referrals via homophilous social networks can explain part of the total
wage gap stemming from the glass-ceiling effect in Germany (6.4%). This mechanism is
amplified by more hierarchical firm structures, stronger clustering of social networks, and
earlier promotion times.
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1 Introduction
Women are much less represented on the managerial level of firms than men. This is known as
the glass-ceiling effect. Moreover, women earn substantially less than men.1
In how far the under-representation of women in decision making positions contributes to the
gender wage gap can be exemplified with the help of a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca,
1973) of the raw gender wage differentials for Germany. Table 1 shows the male and female
employment shares and gross monthly wages by hierarchical level for a sample of 2403 high-
skill full-time employees drawn from the records of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Females are less likely to occupy the top and middle management positions with only 13.9%
of women in this group reaching the upper level and 64.3% remaining in non-management
jobs. Moreover, positions in top and middle management pay on average 71% more than non-
management positions.
Table 1: Employment shares and wages
Fractions in % Predicted wages, all
Hierarchical level Females Males All in e Normalized
Middle/top management jobs 13.94 25.78 21.09 5579.0 1.713
Lower management jobs 21.76 27.32 25.12 4295.0 1.319
Non-management jobs 64.30 46.90 53.79 3255.4 1.000
Data source: SOEP (2013).
The same data shows that the gender wage gap in this group of full-time high skilled men and
women amounts to 31%. Out of this difference 16.4% is the endowment effect, i.e. the fraction
of the wage difference that is related to women having different socio-economic characteristics or
jobs. In particular, within the endowment effect 10% can be explained by the fact that females
are younger, less experienced, overrepresented in service occupations, and employed in smaller
firms. In addition, the female participation rate is higher in Eastern Germany and the average
salary level is lower in this region which contributes significantly to the gender wage gap. We do
not find significant differences in formal qualification and education indicating that conventional
human capital explanation for the gender wage gap vanished in Germany as it did in other devel-
oped economies (see Blau and Kahn, 2017, for the US). The remaining 6.4% of the endowment
effect are explained by the fact that women are situated in lower hierarchical positions than
men, which can be interpreted as the glass-ceiling effect.2 This evidence, once more, underpins
the assessment by Francois (1998) that “In contemporary labor markets, discrimination rarely
takes the form of women being paid less than men in the same jobs at the same establishments,
but is manifest in men having better access to higher paying jobs within an occupation type,
even when traditional labor market characteristics are controlled for.” (p.4).
1According to McKinsey&Company (2017), based on data of 222 U.S. companies employing more than 12
million people, women are significantly underrepresented in the corporate pipeline, and at every higher level
the representation of women declines. Among the largest listed companies in the 28 countries of the European
Union only 15.8% of the decision making positions were held by women in 2017, see Gender Statistics Database,
Women and Men in Decision Making http://eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_bus_
bus__wmid_comp_compex/bar/table. Based on Eurostat’s Structure of Earnings Survey, the International Labor
Office reports, see ILO (2016, p.82), an overall gender pay gap close to 20%. For Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
the gap is twice as large and it continues to wide to 50% among the top 1% earners.
2Further details of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition are presented in Appendix I.
2
Our paper addresses the gender wage gap arising from females not making it to the higher
managerial positions in firms. We develop a search and matching model with referral hiring via
endogenous professional networks that accounts for job-to-job mobility and internal promotions
within hierarchical firms. We use our model to shed light on gender inequality generated by
differences in the endogenous formation of professional networks between men and women and
evaluate the magnitude of this effect for realistic parameter values. In particular, we ask the
following questions: (a) Can there be an unequal representation of women along the hierarchy
of firms without discrimination and occupational segregation? (b) Is there a role to be played
for the depth of firms’ hierarchies with respect to gender representation? (c) What is the
contribution of contact network characteristics to females’ employment shares on managerial
positions, and finally (d) What effect does gender-based discrimination in promotions have on
females’ representation in managerial jobs?
Our model follows the lines of Dawid et al. (2018) extended in three important dimensions.
First, we consider two gender groups featuring lower participation rates of women in the mar-
ket for professional full-time jobs. Second, we incorporate hierarchical firms for which we can
change the depth of the hierarchy. So workers can obtain wage increases by means of internal
promotions and by moving to new employers. In modeling internal promotions we follow the
seminal approach by Gibbons and Waldman (1999), so workers need to accumulate a specific
level of experience/human capital in order to be considered for a promotion. Third, we generate
endogenous professional networks for both worker groups. We model network formation as a
random process over time.3 Workers meet at random and establish new network links, while
existing links are destroyed at some exogenous rate. An important feature of our model is that
link formation is subject to gender homophily implying that similar workers are more likely
to form social links (McPherson et al., 2001). Firms can promote workers internally or post
vacancies on an external market to which workers from other firms can apply. There is network
recruitment on the external market such that applicants may be referred by an internal member
of the firm with whom they share a network link.
Several new results can be obtained from our framework. We find that an unequal rep-
resentation of women along the hierarchy of firms, that is the glass-ceiling effect, can emerge
without occupational segregation, direct discrimination in formal hiring, or unequal promotion
chances. For this to occur in our set-up, women need to be under-represented in the labor mar-
ket and network formation has to be homophilous. Intuitively, network homophily implies that
individuals from the same gender group are more likely to communicate with each other and
establish a network link. Later this network link may lead to a job referral which helps workers
to progress in their careers by means of job-to-job transitions. The fact that referral hiring
exhibits a gender bias is empirically documented by Fernandez and Sosa (2005). We show that
gender-biased referring does not lead to wage inequality if the two gender groups are equally
large. It is only if women are a minority in their occupation, lower probability of creating social
links with the majority group of men generates smaller professional networks of women, and
leads to the disadvantage in the career progression as long as referral hiring is at place. The
effect of homophilous networks on the glass-ceiling effect is amplified for deeper firm hierarchies,
shorter promotion times, and more clustered networks as they arise with triadic closures in the
3For strategic network formation in the labour market see an early study by Calvo´-Armengol (2004).
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spirit of Simmel (1908). Numerically, we find that network homophily combined with a minority
status of women (30% of the labour force in the occupation) may explain up to 42% of the wage
gap attributed to the glass-ceiling effect. This means up to 2.7% out of 6.4% in a country like
Germany. Finally, we find that the gender-wage differential increases even further as we allow
for discrimination along the promotion path in firms.
We proceed with a review of the related literature. In Section 3 we introduce our analytical
apparatus, and in Section 4 we present the results with respect to the network formation and the
gender distribution along the hierarchical levels of the firm. In Section 5 we introduce extensions
to our analytical framework and analyze them within an agent-based simulation. The last section
concludes.
2 Literature review
We are not aware of formal investigations of how networks, referrals, and the depth of firm
hierarchies are associated with each other in search and matching labor markets. Each of these
topics has received considerable attention on its own, however. Since M. Granovetter’s assertion
that “Careers are not made up of random jumps from one job to another, but rather that
individuals rely on contacts acquired at various stages of their work-life, and before. (1995,
p.85)” various empirical studies confirmed that a large fraction – sometimes close to and above
50% – of the employees found their jobs via personal contacts.4
From a theoretical perspective the seminal model on referral hiring was developed by Mont-
gomery (1991) who formalized the idea of network homophily. In particular, he described ho-
mophily by ability, when high ability employees recommend high ability contacts from their
network. This approach was incorporated into a search and matching model by Galenianos
(2013), however, none of the two studies considers gender homophily and hierarchical firms.
Other theoretical contributions on referral hiring in a search and matching framework include
Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou (2005), Ioannides and Soetevent (2006), Fontaine (2008), Galenianos
(2014) and Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2017). Galenianos (2014) investigates cross-sectional fre-
quency of referrals and shows that more intensive referral hiring is associated with more efficient
matching in a given sector. Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) and Fontaine (2008) show that
larger social networks improve job-finding chances of unemployed workers as well as their wage
bargaining position in the negotiation with firms. This mechanism implies that heterogeneity
in the composition of networks is translated into the equilibrium wage inequality. Hence, their
focus is on network-driven differences in wages earned by workers performing identical jobs. In
contrast to this approach, we assume that wages in the same jobs are identical for all workers and
investigate the role of social networks for the distribution of workers across different hierarchical
positions. The particular mechanism of referral hiring that we use is similar to Calvo´-Armengol
and Zenou (2005) and Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2017).
To the best of our knowledge there are only three studies that analyze the implications of
social networks in the market with job-to-job mobility. These are Horvath (2014), Zaharieva
(2015) and Arbex et al. (2018). The latter paper builds on the early work by Mortensen and
4Pistaferri (1999) shows it for Italy, Addison and Portugal (2002) for Portugal, Bentolila et al. (2010) and
Pellizzari (2010) for the United States and the European Union, and Rebien et al. (2017) for Germany.
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Vishwanath (1994) and assumes that employees refer their friends to jobs with the same wage as
their own. In this case the distribution of network offers is superior to the standard wage offer
distribution. A different approach is undertaken in Horvath (2014) and Zaharieva (2015). In
these studies employees forward job offers that are (weakly) worse then their own, so network job
offers are negatively selected. This selection effect is also present in our model since workers refer
their network contacts to lower hierarchical positions than their own, but there is an additional
competition effect: if one worker group moves faster in the job ladder it reduces the number of
senior positions available to the other group, because the two groups are directly competing for
a fixed number of jobs. This effect is absent in the previous work.
Next our study is related to the literature analysing job search via social networks in a
simulation framework. This group of studies includes Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004),
Bramoulle´ and Saint-Paul (2010), or Ko¨nig et al. (2014), as well as work that has taken the
agent-based simulation approach as, among others, Tassier and Menczer (2008), Gemkow and
Neugart (2011), or Dawid and Gemkow (2013). None of these contributions, however, modeled
the hiring and promotion decisions of firms with hierarchies in connection with endogenously
evolving social networks.
Following the “Invisibility Hypothesis” by Milgrom and Oster (1987) several studies mention
the fact that women have a lack of “old-boys-club” connections as another factor for worse po-
sitioning of women in the job ladders (Cassidy et al., 2016; Bertrand et al., 2018). Even though
differences in professional networks between men and women are often mentioned as a factor
for observed diverging labor market performances, so far there were hardly any attempts to in-
vestigate the underlying mechanism with notable exceptions by Rubineau and Fernandez (2013,
2015). They analyze the interaction of the supply and demand side for hiring decisions of firms
theoretically with Markov switching models. Contrary to their analyses, we place hierarchical
firms in a labor market with search frictions. Empirically, the demand side perspective was inves-
tigated by Kmec (2005) who look into the organizational practices to locate and hire workers, or
by Fernandez and Abraham (2010, 2011), Fernandez and Campero (2017) and Fernandez-Mateo
and Fernandez (2016) who show that the gendered composition across levels of the organization
can be traced back to the gendered nature of the candidate pools for jobs at the different levels.
Given that referral hiring is an important feature of the labour market and social networking
becomes more relevant with a rapid development of communication software (e.g. Facebook,
LinkedIn) our study attempts to investigate the role of social and professional networks for gender
inequality in the presence of hierarchical firms. Our contribution seeks to offer a theoretical
model that clarifies the mechanisms that may underlie these empirical findings. In a setting
with hierarchical firms initial segregation of homophilous referral networks leads to a smaller
fraction of women reaching senior positions. This implies that women have lower chances of
recommending new applicants to mid-level positions contrary to Rubineau and Fernandez (2015).
So demand-side effects are endogenous and amplify the segregating effect of homophilous network
recruitment in our model.
Related to the hierarchical nature of the firms, one may also mention studies that document
gender-based discrimination in the process of formal hiring, see Firth (1982) for the UK, Neumark
et al. (1996) for the US, and Petit (2007) for France, or along the promotion path of firms. Blau
and DeVaro (2007), Kauhanen and Napari (2015) and Cassidy et al. (2016) show that women
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have lower promotion probabilities within firms in the US and in Finnland. However, unequal
promotion chances are not supported for countries like Germany and the United Kingdom,
see Chadi and Goerke (2018) and Booth et al. (2018), respectively. We take up the issue of
discrimination along the promotion path of firms in one of our simulation-based extensions.
Finally, the search and matching framework introduced by Diamond (1982), Mortensen
(1982), and Pissarides (1985) within which we model firms’ recruitment behavior and work-
ers’ network formation has become one of the workhorse models in labor economics.
3 The Model
In a nutshell our model has the following characteristics: time is continuous and workers enter
and exit the market at an exogenous rate ρ. The total population size is normalized to 1 and
there is no population growth. There are two types of agents: female workers (F ) and male
workers (M). Fraction h ≤ 0.5 of workers are of type F and fraction 1 − h ≥ 0.5 are of type
M . This parameter allows us to capture the lower participation rate of women in professional
full-time jobs. All workers are identical with respect to their education. Job ladders consist
of three hierarchical levels: low-level jobs, middle management and senior management. Later
in the paper we also consider an extension to four levels. Positions in the first hierarchical
level are freely available to all workers without search frictions. Further, there are two separate
submarkets with search frictions: in the first submarket young workers apply for positions in
middle management. In these positions workers accumulate experience on the job and as they
have reached a sufficient level (x) they qualify for a senior managerial job. They are promoted by
their current employer if there is a vacancy on the senior level in their firm, otherwise they start
applying for senior positions in the second submarket. For external hires, workers who get a
referral have a competitive edge. They may get a referral from a worker on a higher hierarchical
level of the hiring firm who is a member of their network. These networks form endogenously
and can be homophilous.
In Section 3.1 we describe how social networks are formed and continue with the referral
process via networks in Section 3.2. Further, in Section 3.3 we describe the structure of firms
and workers’ mobility patterns within and between firms.
3.1 Social networks
At rate φ every worker can be randomly matched with another worker. Formation of social
links is subject to (gender) homophily, that is workers are more likely to create social links with
others of the same type (see McPherson et al., 2001). Let τ0 denote the probability of creating a
social link with a worker of a different type and τ ≥ τ0 be the probability of creating a link with
another worker of the same type (conditional on matching). Note that the special case when
τ = τ0 corresponds to the situation without homophily. We consider directed links. This means
that, if two workers A and B are randomly matched, it is possible that B becomes a social
contact of A but not vice versa. The reason behind this assumption is that we only keep track of
professional contacts rather than friendship ties, and assume that the person is ready to give a
job referral/recommendation to each of his/her contacts at any point in time. Thus, our setting
captures situations where person A is ready to refer person B for the job but not necessarily
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the other way round. Intuitively, this is similar to the directed links in citation networks. Every
social link can be destroyed at rate δ.
Let ξijk denote a fraction of type i workers with exactly k social contacts of type j, i, j ∈
{M,F}. This is a fraction out of all type i workers. Consider some type M worker without
contacts of the same type. With our notation this worker belongs to the group ξMM0 . At rate φ
this worker is matched with some other agent. With probability 1− h this agent is of the same
type M , and the social link is created with probability τ . Next consider a worker of type M
with only one contact of the same type belonging to the group ξMM1 . This person may lose his
contact at rate δ. In the steady state (when variables ξMMk are constant), the propensity for the
worker to make transition between the two states k − 1 and k will be equalized, this means:
ξMM0 φ(1− h)τ = δξMM1 ⇒ ξMM1 =
ξMM0 φ(1− h)τ
δ
ξMM1 φ(1− h)τ = 2δξMM2 ⇒ ξMM2 = ξMM0
(φ(1− h)τ
δ
)2 1
2
ξMMk−1 φ(1− h)τ = kδξMMk ⇒ ξMMk = ξMM0
(φ(1− h)τ
δ
)k 1
k!
Let ψMM ≡ φ(1 − h)τ/δ. Since all fractions ξMMk should add up to 1 for k = 0...∞ we get:
ξMM0 = e
−ψMM and the number of type M contacts has a Poisson distribution with parameter
ψMM . Intuitively, ψMM is the average number of male contacts in the professsional network of
a randomly chosen male worker:
ξMMk = e
−ψMM
(
ψMM
)k 1
k!
Alternatively, the type M person can be matched with another person of type F , which happens
at rate φh. So the social link is formed at rate τ0. Repeating the same steps as above we get:
ξMFk = e
−ψMF
(
ψMF
)k 1
k!
where ψMF ≡ φhτ0
δ
Here ψMF is the average number of female contacts in the professsional network of a randomly
chosen male worker. Let nM denote the average network size for type M workers and γM be
the fraction of type M contacts in the network, so we get:
nM = ψMM + ψMF =
φ
δ
[(1− h)τ + hτ0] γM = (1− h)τ
(1− h)τ + hτ0
Using the same approach for type F workers we get:
nF = ψFF + ψFM =
φ
δ
[hτ + (1− h)τ0] γF = hτ
hτ + (1− h)τ0
where nF is the total network size of female workers and γF is a fraction of type F contacts
in their network. One can see that the case of full homophily (τ0 = 0) leads to the complete
segregation of social networks between the two genders, that is γM = γF = 1. In the opposite
case without homophily (τ0 = τ), the fraction of contacts of the same type is equal to the fraction
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of this type in the total population, that is γM = 1 − h and γF = h. Comparing the average
sizes of social networks for male and female workers one can show the following:
nM − nF = φ
δ
[(1− h)τ + hτ0 − hτ − (1− h)τ0] = φ
δ
(1− 2h)(τ − τ0)
Thus male workers have larger networks on average (nM > nF ) for h < 0.5 and τ0 < τ .
Intuitively, this shows that professional networks of women tend to be smaller compared to men
if women are the minority in the labour market (h < 0.5) and social connections exhibit some
degree of homophily (τ0 < τ). We can also see that female contacts are underrepresented in the
networks of male workers (1 − γM < h), whereas they are overrepresented in the networks of
female workers (γF > h):
1− γM = hτ0
(1− h)τ + hτ0 = h
1
(1− h) ττ0 + h
< h for τ0 < τ
γF =
hτ
hτ + (1− h)τ0 = h
1
(1− h) τ0τ + h
> h for τ0 < τ
Recall that h is the fraction of women participating in the labour market. This finding forms
the ground for gender-biased referrals in our model which is presented in the following section.
3.2 Labour market
There are three types of jobs in the market: low-level, mid-level and high-level jobs. For simplic-
ity we assume that there are no frictions in the market for low-level jobs and there are infinitely
many of these jobs available to both worker groups. For the purpose of tractability we assume
that there is no unemployment in the model, however, low-level jobs are intuitively similar to
the state of unemployment, hence all workers in low-level jobs are searching and applying for
better positions. Firms providing low-level jobs are not explicitly modeled in the paper. Let ei0
denote the measure/number of type i workers employed in low-level jobs, i = M,F . Workers do
not gain any professional experience by performing low-level jobs.
In addition to firms offering low-level jobs there are professional positions provided by firms
operating in a frictional market. The total number of these firms is fixed and denoted by d.
All these firms are identical and every firm is a dyad consisting of two positions: one middle
level position (supervisor) and one senior level position (manager). Thus job ladders consist
of three hierarchical levels. Here we build on the model by Dawid et al. (2018). In Section
5 we extend our benchmark model to more than three levels and analyse the implications of
deeper firm hierarchies. At rate ρ every worker may exit the market for exogenous reasons and
is substituted with a new agent of the same gender who enters the pool of young inexperienced
workers e0 = e
M
0 + e
F
0 . So the total population is constant over time. From the perspective of
firms ρ is the job destruction shock. Let ei1 denote the number of type i workers employed in
mid-level jobs and ei2 – the number of type i workers employed in senior jobs, i = M,F , so:
eF0 + e
F
1 + e
F
2 = h and e
M
0 + e
M
1 + e
M
2 = 1− h
Once accepted in the mid-level position workers start accumulating professional experience x ≥ 0
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with x˙ = 1. All workers in mid-level jobs have to accumulate an exogenously given experience
level x¯ to become eligible for senior positions. Here we follow the human capital approach to
promotions developed by Gibbons and Waldman (1999). Experience accumulation is costly for
workers so it stops at x¯ since there are no incentives for workers to accumulate more human
capital than required by firms. This is also a proxy for the decreasing returns to learning-by-
doing. If the senior position is open, firms commit to promote their employees with experience
x¯ to senior positions. If there is no worker eligible for promotion the firm is posting an open
high-level vacancy on the external market. If there is no open senior position in the firm, the
worker with experince x¯ starts applying to senior positions in other firms. This is the process
of on-the-job search. Experience x is observable and can be transferred to other firms if the
worker changes the job voluntarily. Workers with experience x < x¯ are not eligible for senior
positions in any company, thus there are no reasons for them to search on-the-job. Note that
the experience requirement x¯ and the probability of internal promotion are identical for male
and female workers. We make this assumption as the evidence on promotion chances for men
and women within firms is inconclusive. This assumption also allows us to focus on the role
of social networks and investigate this channel in the isolation from other factors generating
the glass-ceiling effect. We extend our benchmark framework and consider unequal promotion
chances and their interaction with the network channel in Section 5.
There are two separate matching markets in our model, one where firms post mid-level
positions and anticipate inexperienced workers with x = 0 and another one where firms post
their senior positions and anticipate workers with experience x = x¯. Variable d00 denotes the
stock of empty firms in the market, whereas d01 is the stock of firms with a senior manager
but no supervisor. Since all these firms have an open mid-level position the total stock of open
mid-level positions available for matching is equal to d00 + d01. These positions are randomly
matched with z1e0 searching workers employed in low-level jobs, where z1 denotes exogenous
search effort of workers applying to mid-level jobs. More precisely, z1 is the fraction of searching
workers who prepare and send an application at every instant of time. To determine the number
of matches in the submarket for mid-level positions we use an urn-ball matching mechanism
(see, e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). This mechanism yields the formal matching rate
q1 for firms:
q1 = 1−
(
1− 1
d00 + d01
)z1e0
(1)
With probability α1 = e
M
0 /e0 the chosen candidate is of type M and with a counterprobability
(1− α1) = eF0 /e0 the person is of type F . Note that:
α1 =
(1− h)µM
(1− h)µM + hµF
where µi = ei0/(1 − h) is the equilibrium fraction of type i workers employed in low-level jobs,
i = M,F . This equation shows the following. If the distribution of workers across the hierarchical
levels is identical for male and female workers, then µM = µF and α1 = 1−h. So the probability
that the hired job candidate is of type M is equal to the population average 1− h. However, if
female workers are overrepresented at the bottom (µF > µM ) a randomly matched job candidate
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is more likely to be a female and α1 < 1− h.
In addition to the formal application process some mid-level positions can be filled by refer-
rals. Consider firms of type d01 consisting of d0F and d0M , depending on the type of the senior
manager. With probability s in both types of firms the senior manager is asked to recommend
a contact for the open mid-level position. On average, type M managers have nMγM type M
contacts. So with probability (1− µM )nMγM the senior manager doesn’t know any type M can-
didate for the mid-level position. In addition, type M managers have nM (1− γM ) type F social
contacts, but with probability (1−µF )nM (1−γM ) all of them are already employed in professional
jobs. With this information we obtain the following probability that there is at least one social
contact recommended by the male senior manager:
q˜M1 = s
(
1− (1− µM )nMγM (1− µF )nM (1−γM )
)
If the manager has several social contacts employed in low-level jobs, the manager randomly
chooses one of them independent of the gender and refers this contact for the open position in
his firm. The referred candidate is of type M with probability α˜M1 and of type F with probability
1− αM1 , where α˜M1 depends on the composition of the network:
α˜M1 =
γMµM
γMµM + (1− γM )µF =
(1− h)µM
(1− h)µM + hµF · (1−γM )(1−h)γMh
This equation shows that α˜M1 > α1 in homophilous networks because
(1−γM )(1−h)
γMh
< 1 for
τ0 < τ . Intutively, this means that a candidate referred by the male manager is more likely to
be a male worker compared to the formal channel even if the manager doesn’t have any taste for
discrimination and randomizes between all of his social contacts interested in the mid-level job.
Following the same logic we define q˜F1 – the probability that there is at least one social contact
recommended by the female senior manager:
q˜F1 = s
(
1− (1− µM )nF (1−γF )(1− µF )nF γF
)
Further, α˜F1 – probability for a type F manager of recommending a type M candidate from the
network, so that:
α˜F1 =
(1− γF )µM
(1− γF )µM + γFµF =
(1− h)µM
(1− h)µM + hµF · γF (1−h)(1−γF )h
This shows that a candidate recommended by the female manager is less likely to be a male
worker compared to the formal hiring channel, that is α˜F1 < α1 for τ0 < τ .
Summarizing, we can see that firms with an open mid-level position and a type M senior
manager will fill their position with a type M candidate at rate q1α1 via the formal application
process and via the network at rate q˜M1 α˜
M
1 . We do not assume that the recommended candidate
is preferred to the external candidates. Rather all applicants for a given mid-level position are
pooled together and a random draw is made. So the recommended applicant has the same
chances as external applicants given that all of them have the same qualification. Assuming
preference for the recommended candidate would amplify the network effect in the quantitative
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estimation. Let the total job-filling rate with a type M candidate be denoted by q¯MM1 . In
addition, the open position can be filled with a type F candidate at the total rate q¯FM1 :
q¯MM1 = q1α1 + q˜
M
1 α˜
M
1 and q¯
FM
1 = q1(1− α1) + q˜M1 (1− α˜M1 )
Finally, consider firms with an open mid-level position and a type F senior manager. These
firms will fill their position with a type M candidate at rate q1α1 via the formal application
process and via the network at rate q˜F1 α˜
F
1 . Let the total job-filling rate with a type M candidate
be denoted by q¯MF1 . In addition, the open position can be filled with a type F candidate at the
total rate q¯FF1 :
q¯MF1 = q1α1 + q˜
F
1 α˜
F
1 and q¯
FF
1 = q1(1− α1) + q˜F1 (1− α˜F1 )
Notice the following, when referral hiring is not used, that is s = 0, the rate at which a male
candidate is hired is equal to q1α1, and the rate at which a female candidate is hired is equal to
q1(1− α1). Both are independent of the gender of the senior manager.
Further, let d10 = dF0 +dM0 denote firms with a middle-level worker but no senior manager.
This means that the total number of open managerial positions is given by d00 + d10. Finally,
let dN11 = d
N
MF + d
N
MM + d
N
FF + d
N
FM denote the stock of full firms with both employees, where
the worker in the mid-level position is not yet eligible for promotion (x < x¯). In a similar way,
dS11 = d
S
MF +d
S
MM +d
S
FF +d
S
FM – is the stock of full firms, where the mid-level worker is already
eligible for senior positions (x = x¯) and searching on-the-job. This means that the stock of
applicants in the managerial market is given by z2d
S
11, where z2 is the exogenous search intensity
of experienced workers. So the urn-ball matching rate in the managerial market q2 is given by:
q2 = 1−
(
1− 1
d00 + d10
)z2dS11
With probability α2 the firm will be matched with a type M experienced mid-level worker and
hire him for the manager position and with a counter-probability 1−α2 the firm will be matched
with a type F experienced mid-level worker and hire her as a manager:
α2 =
dSMF + d
S
MM
dS11
So the total job-filling rate with a type M candidate is given by q2α2 and q2(1 − α2) with a
type F candidate. Note that we assume that workers don’t recommend their contacts for senior
positions, so there are no referrals on this level. Also in our setting it is not rational for mid-
level workers to refer their contacts for senior positions, since they are hoping to be promoted
themselves in the future. Moreover, there is no favoritism and gender-based discrimination in
the process of formal hiring as we seek to identify a separate effect of homophilous networks on
labour market outcomes in isolation from other factors.
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3.3 Firm Dynamics
In this section we analyse the transformation of firms as workers enter and exit jobs as well as
the steady-state distributions of workers and firms. Consider changes in the stock of empty firms
d00. Since every empty firm posts both the mid-level and the senior position in the respective
submarkets it exits the state d00 whenever it finds the first employee. So the outflow of firms
from d00 takes place at rate q1 + q2. The inflow into this state consists of all firms with only
one employee experiencing the job destruction/exit shock ρ. These are the firms dF0 dM0, d0F
and d0M . In this paper we restrict our analysis to the steady states and consider a stationary
distribution of workers and firms across states. This means that d˙00 = 0 in the steady state:
0 = d˙00 = ρ(dF0 + dM0 + d0F + d0M )− (q1 + q2)d00 (2)
Further, consider changes in the stocks of firms dF0(x), d
N
FM (x) and d
N
FF (x). Note that workers
with experience 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯ are not yet searching on-the-job since their experience is not sufficient
for managerial positions and there are no gains from changing to another mid-level job. This
means that the inflow of firms into state dF0(x) is equal to ρ(d
N
FM (x) + d
N
FF (x)). These are the
firms where the manager exits at rate ρ and they are left with only one mid-level worker of type
F . If the manager exits firms post the open position in the second submarket for experienced
workers and find a manager at rate q2. This means that the outflow of workers from the state
dF0(x) is equal to (q2 + ρ)dF0(x) where the term ρdF0(x) corresponds to the job destruction
shock ρ of the mid-level position. So we get the following differential equation5:
∂dF0(x)
∂x
= ρ(dNFM (x) + d
N
FF (x))− (ρ+ q2)dF0(x)
Next we take into account changes in the stock of firms dNFM (x) and d
N
FF (x). Each of these firms
has exactly two filled positions, so the job destruction shock arrives at the increased rate 2ρ.
The inflow of firms into category dNFF (x) is equal to q2(1−α2)dF0(x). These are the firms dF0(x)
filling their senior position with a type F candidate. In a similar way, the inflow of firms into
category dNFM (x) is equal to q2α2dF0(x). These are the firms dF0(x) filling their senior position
with a type M candidate. So we get the following two differential equations:
∂dNFF (x)/∂x = q2(1− α2)dF0(x)− 2ρdNFF (x)
∂dNFM (x)/∂x = q2α2dF0(x)− 2ρdNFM (x)
5In general the stock variable dF0(x, t) may depend on time t, so the total derivative is given by:
∂dF0(x, t)
∂x
∂x
∂t
+
∂dF0(x, t)
∂t
= ρ(dNFM (x) + d
N
FF (x))− (ρ+ q2)dF0(x)
Since the distribution of firms dF0(x, t) is stationary in the steady state we set the time derivative d˙F0 =
∂dF0(x,t)
∂t
equal to zero. Moreover, experience x is accumulating one to one with the time because x˙ = ∂x/∂t = 1).
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The coefficient matrix of the three first order linear differential equations for {dF0(x), dNFF (x), dNFM (x)}
has three eigenvalues equal to: −2ρ, −ρ and −(2ρ+ q2). So the general solution is given by:
dF0(x) = k
F
2
ρ2
q2
e−ρx − kF3 q2e−(2ρ+q2)x
dNFF (x) = k
F
1 e
−2ρx + kF2 ρ(1− α2)e−ρx + kF3 q2(1− α2)e−(2ρ+q2)x
dNFM (x) = −kF1 e−2ρx + kF2 ρα2e−ρx + kF3 q2α2e−(2ρ+q2)x
In order to find the constant terms kF1 , k
F
2 and k
F
3 we use the following initial conditions: q1(1−
α1)d00 = dF0(0), q¯
FF
1 d0F = d
N
FF (0) and q¯
FM
1 d0M = d
N
FM (0). The first condition implies that the
stock dF0(0) consists of firms d00 finding a mid-level worker of type F , that is q1(1−α1)d00. The
second condition implies that the stock of firms dNFF (0) consists of firms d0F who find a mid-level
worker of type F at rate q¯FF1 . The third condition implies that the stock of firms d
N
FM (0) consists
of firms d0M who find a mid-level worker of type F at rate q¯
FM
1 . Exact expressions for k
F
1 , k
F
2
and kF3 are provided in Appendix II.
Note that in all three states dF0(x), d
N
FF (x), d
N
FM (x) female workers employed in mid-
level positions remain inactive and accumulate experience till it reaches the minimum level x¯
necessary for the senior position. If the senior position is free, the mid-level worker is immediately
promoted, so the stock of firms dF0(x¯) is one of the entries into the stock d0F . However, if the
senior position is not vacant, then mid-level workers start searching and applying for senior
positions in other firms. This means that stocks of firms dNFM (x¯) and d
N
FF (x¯) are the entries into
dSFM and d
S
FF respectively. This meachanism allows us to obtain the total stocks of firms dF0,
dNFF and d
N
FM be integrating from x = 0 till x = x¯. This yields the following:
dF0 =
kF2 ρ
q2
(1− e−ρx¯)− k
F
3 q2
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯) (3)
dNFF =
kF1
2ρ
(1− e−2ρx¯) + kF2 (1− α2)(1− e−ρx¯) +
kF3 q2(1− α2)
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯) (4)
dNFM = −
kF1
2ρ
(1− e−2ρx¯) + kF2 α2(1− e−ρx¯) +
kF3 q2α2
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯) (5)
Next, we repeat our analysis with the stocks of firms dM0(x), d
N
MM (x) and d
N
MF (x), where
there is a male worker employed in the mid-level position. This yields the following system of
differential equations:
∂dM0(x)/∂x = ρ(d
N
MF (x) + d
N
MM (x))− (ρ+ q2)dM0(x)
∂dNMM (x)/∂x = q2α2dM0(x)− 2ρdNMM (x)
∂dNMF (x)/∂x = q2(1− α2)dM0(x)− 2ρdNMF (x)
Firms of the type dM0(x) are searching for a senior manager and find one at rate q2. With
probability α2 the chosen candidate is a male worker, so the firm makes transition into the
state dNMM (x). Here the mid-level employee is also a male worker with experience x < x¯. With
the counter-probability 1− α2 the new senior manager is a female worker, so the firm makes a
transition into the state dNMF (x). The three eigenvalues of this system of differential equations
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are again −2ρ, −ρ and −(2ρ+ q2), so the general solution is:
dM0(x) = k
M
2
ρ2
q2
e−ρx − kM3 q2e−(2ρ+q2)x
dNMM (x) = k
M
1 e
−2ρx + kM2 ρα2e
−ρx + kM3 q2α2e
−(2ρ+q2)x
dNMF (x) = −kM1 e−2ρx + kM2 ρ(1− α2)e−ρx + kM3 q2(1− α2)e−(2ρ+q2)x
In order to find the constant terms kM1 , k
M
2 and k
M
3 we use the following initial conditions:
q1α1d00 = dM0(0), q¯
MM
1 d0M = d
N
MM (0) and q¯
MF
1 d0F = d
N
MF (0). The first condition implies that
the stock dF0(0) consists of firms d00 finding a mid-level worker of type M , that is q1α1d00. The
second condition implies that the stock of firms dNMM (0) consists of firms d0M who find a mid-
level worker of type M at rate q¯MM1 . The third condition implies that the stock of firms d
N
MF (0)
consists of firms d0F who find a mid-level worker of type M at rate q¯
MF
1 . Exact expressions
for kM1 , k
M
2 and k
M
3 are again provided in Appendix II. Finally, integrating variables dM0(x),
dNMM (x) and d
N
MF (x) from x = 0 till x = x¯ we get the following:
dM0 =
kM2 ρ
q2
(1− e−ρx¯)− k
M
3 q2
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯) (6)
dNMM =
kM1
2ρ
(1− e−2ρx¯) + kM2 α2(1− e−ρx¯) +
kM3 q2α2
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯) (7)
dNMF = −
kM1
2ρ
(1− e−2ρx¯) + kM2 (1− α2)(1− e−ρx¯) +
kM3 q2(1− α2)
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯) (8)
To close the model, consider the stocks of firms dSFF , d
S
FM , d
S
MM and d
S
MF . In all these firms the
mid-level worker has experience more than x¯ and is already searching for a senior position. We
already know that dNFM (x¯) and d
N
FF (x¯) are the only entries into d
S
FM and d
S
FF respectively. In a
similar way, variables dNMF (x¯) and d
N
MM (x¯) are the only entries into d
S
MF and d
S
MM . There are
three possible events that can alter the state of these firms. Either one of the two employees is
dismissed from the job at rate ρ, or the mid-level worker finds another employment as a senior
manager and quits the firm at rate λ2. Thus we get:
d˙SFF = d
N
FF (x¯)− (2ρ+ λ2)dSFF d˙SMM = dNMM (x¯)− (2ρ+ λ2)dSMM (9)
d˙SFM = d
N
FM (x¯)− (2ρ+ λ2)dSFM d˙SMF = dNMF (x¯)− (2ρ+ λ2)dSMF (10)
Finally, consider the stock of firms d0F . We already know that dF0(x¯) is one of the entries into
d0F , because mid-level workers are promoted to senior positions upon reaching experience x¯.
Also the firms dSFM and d
S
FF promote their female mid-level employees to senior positions in the
event when the senior manager is dimissed, which happens at rate ρ. So the inflow of firms into
d0F , which is due to immediate or delayed promotions is given by dF0(x¯) + ρ(d
S
FM + d
S
FF ).
However, also empty firms d00 are searching for senior managers and find one at rate q2.
With probability α2 the new manager is a male worker, so the firm d00 becomes d0M , but with
probability 1− α2 the new manager is a female worker, so the firm enters the state d0F . Hence
the entry of firms into state d0F , which is due to outside hiring, is equal to q2(1− α2)d00.
In addition, we know that any of the firms dNFF , d
N
MF , d
S
FF and d
S
MF may lose their mid-
level employees at rate ρ due to the exogenous exit and therefore enter the state d0F as the
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only remaining worker in these firms is a senior female manager. So the next entry is ρ(dNFF +
dNMF + d
S
FF + d
S
MF ). Moreover, it can also happen that mid-level employees in firms d
S
FF and
dSMF separate from their employers due to quitting and taking employment in other firms, which
happens at rate λ2. This yields the last entry into the state d0F , namely, λ2(d
S
FF + d
S
MF ).
Summarizing, we find that the entry of firms into the state d0F is given by dF0(x¯) + ρ(d
S
FM +
dSFF ) + q2(1− α2)d00 + ρ(dNFF + dNMF + dSFF + dSMF ) + λ2(dSFF + dSMF ).
Next we investigate the exits of firms from the state d0F . On the one hand, senior managers
may be exit the market at rate ρ rendering the firm empty (d00). On the other hand, firms may
fill their open mid-level position with a female worker, which happens at rate q¯FF1 , or with a
male worker, which happens at rate q¯MF1 . Note that these rates include the possibility of formal
and referral hiring to mid-level positions. So the exit of firms from the state d0F is given by:
(ρ+ q¯FF1 + q¯
MF
1 )d0F . This yields the following differential equations for d0F and d0M :
d˙0F = dF0(x¯) + ρ(d
S
FM + d
S
FF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
promotions of mid-level workers
+ q2(1− α2)d00︸ ︷︷ ︸
outside hiring into senior position
+ ρ(dNFF + d
N
MF + d
S
FF + d
S
MF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
exit of mid-level workers
+ λ2(d
S
FF + d
S
MF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
mid-level workers quitting
(11)
− ρd0F︸ ︷︷ ︸
exit of senior managers
− (q¯FF1 + q¯MF1 )d0F︸ ︷︷ ︸
formal and referral hiring of mid-level workers
d˙0M = dM0(x¯) + ρ(d
S
FM + d
S
MM ) + q2α2d00 + ρ(d
N
MM + d
N
FM + d
S
MM + d
S
FM ) (12)
+ λ2(d
S
MM + d
S
FM )− ρd0M − (q¯MM1 + q¯FM1 )d0M
In this paper we restrict our attention to steady state equilibria, so we set d˙00 = d˙
S
MF = d˙
S
FM =
d˙SMM = d˙
S
FF = d˙0F = d˙0M = 0. Given that this system of equations is over-identified, we
substitute one of the equations by fixing the total number of firms d. This is an exogenous
parameter, which yields:
d00 + dF0 + dM0 + d0F + d0M + d
N
MM + d
N
MF + d
N
FM + d
N
FF + d
S
MM + d
S
MF + d
S
FM + d
S
FF = d(13)
Solving equations (3)-(13) in the steady state we find the equilibrium distribution of firms
{d00, dF0, dM0, d0F , d0M , dNFM , dNFF , dNMF , dNMM , dSFM , dSFF , dSMF , dSMM}. Based on the above dis-
tribution of firms, we can immediately calculate the distribution of male and female workers
in different job levels. Recall that the absolute numbers of workers in different job levels are
denoted by ej0, e
j
1 and e
j
2, j = M,F , so we get:
eF1 = d
N
FF + dF0 + d
N
FM + d
S
FM + d
S
FF e
M
1 = d
N
MM + dM0 + d
N
MF + d
S
MF + d
S
MM (14)
eF2 = d
N
FF + d0F + d
N
MF + d
S
MF + d
S
FF e
M
2 = d
N
MM + d0M + d
N
FM + d
S
FM + d
S
MM (15)
Finally, let variables pj0, p
j
1 and p
j
2 , j = M,F denote the distribution of workers across different
hierarchical levels of firms, that is pM2 = e
M
2 /(1−h), pM1 = eM1 /(1−h), pM0 = 1−pM1 −pM2 . And
same for female workers: pF2 = e
F
2 /h, p
F
1 = e
F
1 /h, p
F
0 = 1− pF1 − pF2 . So pF2 here is the fraction
of female workers in senior managerial positions, whereas pM2 is the corresponding fraction for
male workers.
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4 Numerical results
4.1 Benchmark setting
This section is dedicated to the numerical analysis of the model. We start by setting values
of the parameter vector {ρ, h, d, x¯, z1, z2}. We follow the traditional approach in search theory
and interpret one period of time as one quarter. We choose ρ = 0.015, which implies that the
average employment duration in management jobs (level 1 and 2) is 1/(4 ·ρ) = 16.6 years. Model
I is our benchmark model where both gender groups have equal size, that is h = 0.5. In the
following analysis we also consider participation rates in the range [0.3..0.5]. Parameter x¯ takes
values in the range [40..60] with a benchmark case x¯ = 50, this means that firms require at least
50/4 = 12.5 years of experience for promoting mid-level workers to senior positions. Next we set
d = 0.3 meaning that there are 300 two-level firms in the labour market with 1000 workers. This
leads to potentially 300 · 2 = 600 management jobs. In the model without search frictions and
without experience requirement x¯ this would imply that 60% of (high skill full-time employed)
workers perform management jobs. In this situation, matching parameters z1 and z2 allow us
to replicate the empirically observed distribution for Germany presented in Table 1. So we use
values z1 = 0.0135 and z2 = 0.2 in order to reproduce the distribution p0 = 0.54, p1 = 0.25,
p2 = 0.21. These numbers indicate that only 46% of workers are performing management jobs in
a frictional economy rather than 60%. Intuitively, this implies that 140 out of 600 management
jobs remain vacant on average due to the experience requirement in senior jobs and search
frictions. Our benchmark parameter choices are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Benchmark parameters: 1 period ≈ 1 quarter
Parameter Value Explanation
ρ 0.015 Worker exit rate / Job destruction rate
h 0.500 Fraction of female workers
x¯ 50 Experience level necessary for promotion
d 0.3 Total number of firms per worker
z1 0.0135 Search intensity of workers in low level jobs
z2 0.2 Search intensity of workers in mid-level jobs
Our benchmark model – Model I – is summarized in columns (1)-(2) of Table 3. This is the
model without referrals (s = 0) and with equal participation of males and females (h = 0.5). The
equilibrium transition rates λ1 = 0.0127 and λ2 = 0.1993 can be interpreted in the following way.
On average individuals spend 1/(4 ·λ1) = 20 years in non-management jobs before they become
managers. So if some young individual enters the labour market at the age of 18 years, then this
person becomes a mid-level manager on average at the age of 38 years. Further, firms require
12.5 years of experience in mid-level jobs before these workers become eligible for positions in
senior management. This means, on average, individuals reach the age of 50.5 years when they
are considered as sufficiently experienced to take a senior position. Some of these employees are
immediately promoted by firms within companies whereas others have to wait for a vacant senior
position in their firm, which happens at rate ρ, and search externally. So most workers are at the
age of 51-52 years when they take a senior job. We can also see that q1 = 0.1374 is larger than
q2 = 0.0181. This means that it is much easier for firms to hire mid-level managers than senior
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managers. This is also reflected in the fact that there are more firms without a senior manager
d10 = 0.0806 compared to the number of firms without a mid-level worker d01 = 0.0385. The
numbers of firms are reported per worker. So d10 = 0.0806 implies approximately 81 firms in a
labour market with 1000 workers.
Table 3: Equilibrium values of endogenous variables. Parameters: ρ = 0.015, x¯ = 50, z1 =
0.0135, z2 = 0.2, d = 0.3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
h = 0.5, s = 0 h = 0.3, s = 0 h = 0.3, s = 0.4 h = 0.3, s = 0.4
τ = τ0 = 0.5 τ = 0.5, τ0 = 0.25
M F M F M F M F M F
Fractions of males and females among new hires
α1 1− α1 0.5000 0.5000 0.7000 0.3000 0.7000 0.3000 0.6915 0.3085
α2 1− α2 0.5000 0.5000 0.7000 0.3000 0.7000 0.3000 0.7078 0.2922
α˜M1 1− α˜M1 0.7000 0.3000 0.8175 0.1825
α˜F1 1− α˜F1 0.7000 0.3000 0.5284 0.4716
Job-finding and job-filling rates
λ1 0.0127 0.0127 0.0102 0.0102
λ2 0.1993 0.1993 0.1978 0.1978
q1 0.1374 0.1374 0.5044 0.5044
q2 0.0181 0.0181 0.0378 0.0378
q¯MM1 q¯
FM
1 0.6331 0.2713 0.6758 0.2286
q¯MF1 q¯
FF
1 0.6331 0.2713 0.5601 0.3442
Numbers of firms with vacancies
d00 0.0115 0.0115 0.0019 0.0019
d0M d0F 0.0193 0.0193 0.0270 0.0115 0.0054 0.0023 0.0054 0.0023
d01 0.0385 0.0385 0.0077 0.0077
dM0 dF0 0.0403 0.0403 0.0564 0.0242 0.0425 0.0182 0.0428 0.0180
d10 0.0806 0.0806 0.0607 0.0608
Numbers of complete firms
dNMM d
N
FM 0.0403 0.0403 0.0790 0.0338 0.1067 0.0457 0.1140 0.0401
dNMF d
N
FF 0.0403 0.0403 0.0338 0.0145 0.0457 0.0196 0.0403 0.0233
dN11 0.1612 0.1612 0.2177 0.2177
dSMM d
S
FM 0.0021 0.0021 0.0041 0.0018 0.0058 0.0025 0.0062 0.0023
dSMF d
S
FF 0.0021 0.0021 0.0018 0.0008 0.0025 0.0011 0.0023 0.0012
dS11 0.0084 0.0084 0.0119 0.0119
Distribution of workers across job levels
pM2 p
F
2 0.2080 0.2080 0.2080 0.2080 0.2374 0.2374 0.2400 0.2313
pM1 p
F
1 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2904 0.2904 0.2936 0.2830
pM0 p
F
0 0.5420 0.5420 0.5420 0.5420 0.4722 0.4722 0.4665 0.4857
In the next step we make the model more realistic by reducing the fraction of women in the
market. From German labour market data,SOEP (2013), we know that the fraction of high skill
women performing full-time jobs varies between 18-20% in the energy and construction sector,
and 45-48% in retail trade and non-financial services. In the middle range there is manufacturing,
financial services and transportation with 26-33% of women. Following this empirical evidence
we set the fraction of female workers in our model equal to h = 0.3. This means that 70% of
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workers in the market are males M . This is Model II and it is summarized in columns (3)-(4)
of Table 3. Recall that α1 is a probability that the applicant to the mid-level position is of
type M . Given that M workers are the majority in Model II it is intuitive that α1 = 0.7. This
merely reflects that fact that there are 70% type M workers in the economy. There are also more
firms with male managers: dM0 = 0.0564 > dF0 = 0.0242 and d0M = 0.0270 > d0F = 0.0115.
However, this does not affect the chances of male and female workers in terms of upward mobility.
So the distributions p2, p1 and p0 are identical between male and female workers indicating equal
career opportunities despite the fact that female workers are the minority.
4.2 Network composition
In this section we analyze the structure of social networks in our model. Social networks are
driven by the following vector of parameters {φ, δ, τ, τ0}. Recall that the average number of
directed links of a male worker to other males is given by ψMM =
φ
δ τ(1 − h), whereas the
average number of links to female workers is given by ψMF =
φ
δ τ0h. So the total number of
contacts in the network of a male worker is given by nM = ψMM + ψMF =
ψ
δ [τ(1− h) + τ0h].
Here again we start by considering the situation with equal participation of males and females
h = 1−h = 0.5 and no gender homophily, that is τ = τ0. So the total average number of contacts
for male and female workers is given by nM = nF =
ψ
δ τ . Cingano and Rosolia (2012) report that
the number of social connections between individuals in Italy is about 32. Glitz (2017) reports
a similar number for Germany with approximately 43 social contacts. Thus, we set parameters
ψ = 0.8, δ = 0.01 and τ = 0.5 in order to obtain the average number of social links in the
benchmark model equal to 0.8 · 0.5/0.01 = 40. This means that a given person meets another
one with probability φ = 0.8 per unit time and includes this new person into the network with
probability 0.5. On average every person creates 0.4 social links per unit time. Every link is
destroyed with probability δ = 0.01. With an average number of social links equal to 40, this
means that individuals lose 40 · 0.01 = 0.4 links per unit time. Thus, the social network is
balanced in the equilibrium.
With equal proportions of male and female workers h = 0.5 and no gender homophily (τ = τ0)
we get that half of the links are with workers of the same (opposite) gender. This is illustrated
in panel (A) of Table 4. Next we reduce participation of female workers, so that h = 0.3.
This case is illustrated in panel (B). Since there is still no homophily in this setting, lower
participation of female workers leads to a lower fraction of female workers in the networks of
males and other females. For example, we can see that both genders now have only a fraction
1 − γM = γF = 12/40 of female workers in their networks, which is exactly 30%. Figure 1
(left) shows the corresponding Poisson distributions of social networks, where the left density
illustrates links of both genders to female workers and the right density illustrates links of both
genders to male workers. These distributions only reflect the fact that female workers are the
minority in panel (B).
Further we return to the setting with equal participation h = 0.5 and analyze the implications
of gender homophily, illustrated in panel (C). Here we set τ0 = 0.25 < τ = 0.5. We justify our
choice of the homophily parameter τ0 in the next section when we combine networks and referral
hiring. Panel (C) reveals that gender homophily is erasing half of the cross-gender links and
their average number falls from 20 down to 10. This also reduces the average total number of
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Table 4: Network composition for different parameter values
M F Total M F Total
M 20 20 40 M 20 10 30
F 20 20 40 F 10 20 30
(A): h = 0.5, τ = τ0 = 0.5 (C): h = 0.5, τ = 0.5, τ0 = 0.25
M F Total M F Total
M 28 12 40 M 28 6 34
F 28 12 40 F 14 12 26
(B): h = 0.3, τ = τ0 = 0.5 (D): h = 0.3, τ = 0.5, τ0 = 0.25
links in the social network down to 30. The corresponding Poisson densities are illustrated on
Figure 1 (right) where the dashed curve corresponds to cross-gender connections. We can see
that only 10/30, that is about 33% of links in the networks of male workers are with female
workers, even though both gender groups have the same size in (C). The situation is symmetric
and there are only 33% of links to male workers in the networks of females.
Figure 1: Left: Effect of the participation rate h. Right: Effect of the gender homophily τ0
Finally, we combine the two effects and consider the situation with h = 0.3 (lower participa-
tion of females) and τ0 = 0.25 (gender homophily). This case is contained in part (D) of Table
4. We can see that lower participation of female workers leads to ψMM = 28 and ψFF = 12
as in case (B). At the same time gender homophily is erasing half of the potential cross-gender
contacts, so that ψMF = 6 and ψFM = 14 as in case (C). One direct consequence of the combined
effect is that female workers end up with smaller social networks (nF = 26 < nM = 34). More-
over, the fraction of female contacts in the networks of males is only 6/34, that is 17.6%, which
is well below the population average of 30%. The reason is two-fold, on-the-one hand, female
workers are the minority and, on-the-other hand, it is more difficult to create connections with
the opposite gender. At the same time the fraction of male contacts in the networks of females
is 14/26, that is 53.8%, which is well below the population average of males equal to 70%. The
corresponding four densities are illustrated in Figure 2. Due to the inherent property of the
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Poisson distribution larger mean is associated with a larger variance. The figure reveals that
the standard deviation of the male distribution of male contacts
√
ψMM =
√
28 ≈ 5.3 is much
larger than the standard deviation in the distribution of female contacts
√
ψMF =
√
6 = 2.4. So
the former distribution is more dispersed.
Figure 2: Network densities with gender homophily and lower participation of female workers
4.3 Referral hiring
In this section we incorporate social networks into the model and analyse the implications of
referrals. First, we set s = 0.4, which is the probability that the senior manager is asked to
recommend a contact for the open mid-level position. This parameter is driving the frequency
of referral hiring. Here we follow the empirical literature (Pistaferri, 1999; Addison and Portugal,
2002; Bentolila et al., 2010; Pellizzari, 2010), which reports that 30%-50% of employees are hired
via referrals. For Germany Rebien et al. (2017) show that the average fraction of referral hires
in the years 2012-2015 is equal to 37%.
Model III in Table 3 (columns (5)-(6)) shows the equilibrium with referral hiring, lower
participation of female workers (h = 0.3) but no gender homophily (τ = τ0 = 0.5). This
network type corresponds to case (B) in the previous section. Intensive referral hiring has a
strong impact on the labour market. We can see that the total job-filling rate is relatively
high: q¯MM1 + q¯
FM
1 = 0.9044, indicating that firms with open mid-level positions enjoy 90.44%
probability of filling their position per unit time. This number does not depend on the gender
of the senior manager since q¯MF1 + q¯
FF
1 = 0.9044 and it is much higher than the job-filling rate
in the model without referrals (Model II) where the job-filling rate of mid-level positions was
only 0.1374. Note, that the total job-filling rate q¯MM1 + q¯
FM
1 consists of the formal hiring rate
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q1 = 0.5044 and the referral hiring rate q˜
M
1 = 0.4, so the average fraction of employees hired by
recommendation can be evaluated at 0.4/0.9044 ≈ 0.44, that is 44%.
Model III reveals that the general equilibrium effect is amplifying the consequences of referral
hiring. Since many firms fill their positions via referrals there are less open vacancies for mid-
level jobs d00 +d01. This reduces the competition of firms in the formal hiring process and leads
to the higher job-filling rate q1 = 0.5044 > 0.1374 (see Equation (1)). So referral hiring reduces
the number of firms with empty positions d00 +d01 +d10 which was 0.1306 in Model II and raises
the number of firms with full employment dN11 + d
S
11 which was 0.1696. The numbers in Model
III are now 0.0703 and 0.2297. Intuitively, this means that in the equilibrium there are 60 firms
more with full employment (per 1000 workers) due to referral hiring.
Network hiring also has strong implications for workers as shown in the last rows of Table 3.
Workers move much faster from level 0 to level 1, so the average fraction of workers in the lowast
level is reduced to 47.22%, while the fraction of workers in midddle management is increased
to 29.04%. Even though firms still require x¯ periods of experience for senior management jobs,
more workers start accumulating experience on average and so more workers reach the highest
positions. Finally, Model III reveals that neither differences in the participation rates nor referral
hiring give rise to position differences between male and female workers. Even though female
workers are the minority and both genders are involved into referral hiring, upward mobility
patterns and opportunities are still the same for both groups of workers.
Further, we investigate the consequences of network hiring with homophilous social networks
in Model IV (columns (7)-(8) of Table 3). Conditional on the probability of referral hiring, male
senior managers are more likely to recommend male applicants which happens with probabil-
ity α˜M1 = 0.8175. This probability is substantially higher than the population average of male
workers 0.7. In a similar way, female senior managers tend to over-recommend female job can-
didates with the corresponding probability 1− α˜F1 = 0.4716, which is well above the population
average of female workers equal to 0.3. These numbers are similar to the empirical findings of
Fernandez and Sosa (2005). They find that both genders tend to over-recommend their own
types by about 10% compared to the fraction of their gender among external applicants. This
confirms our choice of the homophily parameter τ0 = 0.25.
If the senior manager in the firm is a male worker, than the rate at which the open mid-level
job is filled with a male applicant is increasing to q¯MM1 = 0.6758 compared to Model III and
the rate at which this position is filled with a female worker is decreasing to q¯FM1 = 0.2286.
In contrast, if the senior manager is a female worker, then the rate at which the job is filled
with a male candidate is decreasing to q¯MF1 = 0.5601, while the rate at which this position is
filled with another female candidate is increasing to q¯FF1 = 0.3442. One important point to be
emphasized is that there are relatively many firms with a male senior manager d0M = 0.0054
and relatively few firms with a female senior manager d0F = 0.0023. This is due to the fact that
female workers are the minority. Thus lower participation of female workers, combined with
intensive referral hiring and network homophily benefits and improves career opportunities of
the majority male group, while worsening the chances of the minority female group. This leads
to the more beneficial distribution of male workers with 46.65% of male workers remaining in low
level jobs on average and 24% becoming senior managers compared to 48.57% of female workers
in the bottom and 23.13% in senior management. Therefore, we conclude that a combination
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of three factors – lower participation of females, referral hiring and network homophily – can
generate the glass-ceiling effect even in the absence of direct discrimination.
4.4 Comparative statics
In this subsection, we perform comparative statics analyses and investigate which factors miti-
gate or amplify the glass-ceiling effect generated in Model IV. First, we vary the female partic-
ipation rate h in the range [0.3..0.5] and calculate the fractions of male and female workers in
lowest and highest positions. The left panel of Figure 3 shows fractions pF0 and p
M
0 . We can
see that these fractions are the same and equal to 0.4722 as a long as both groups are equally
large (h = 0.5). The difference appears as soon as h falls below 0.5 and the gap is increasing
with lower values of h, which means that more and more female workers remain in low level jobs
compared to male workers. For h = 0.3 we reach the values of Model IV with pF0 = 0.4857 and
pM0 = 0.4665. The right panel of Figure 3 shows fractions of male and female worker in senior
positions, that is pF2 and p
M
2 . Again there are no differences between the two gender groups
as long as h = 0.5. The gap is generated as soon as h < 0.5 and it is increasing with lower h
reaching the levels pF2 = 0.2313 and p
M
2 = 0.2400 for h = 0.3. These numbers correspond to
Model IV in Table 3. Overall, we conclude that lower participation of female workers generates
a stronger disadvantage in terms of professional networks for female workers and amplifies the
glass-ceiling effect.
Figure 3: Comparative statics with respect to female participation fraction h. Left: fraction of
employees on level 0 within their gender group, pF0 and p
M
0 . Right: fraction of employees on
level 2 within their gender group, pF2 and p
M
2 .
Next we perform comparative statics analysis with respect to parameter s, which is the
probability that the senior manager is asked to recommend one of his/her contacts for the open
mid-level position. Indirectly this parameter is driving the frequency of referral hires. Figure 4
shows fractions pF0 and p
M
0 and p
F
2 and p
M
2 for s in the interval [0..0.4]. On the left panel we
can see that there are no differences between the two gender groups for s = 0. This is the case
without referrel hiring, where pF0 = p
M
0 = 0.5422. The differences appear as soon as s > 0 and
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the gap is increasing for larger values of s indicating more intensive referrals. When s = 0.4
we obtain the values of Model IV with pF0 = 0.4857 and p
M
0 = 0.4665. The right panel shows
fraction pF2 and p
M
2 . Here we can see that fewer female workers reach senior positions with more
intensive referral hiring.
Figure 4: Comparative statics with respect to the referral intensity s. Left: fraction of employees
on level 0 within their gender group, pF0 and p
M
0 . Right: fraction of employees on level 2 within
their gender group, pF2 and p
M
2 .
The previous analysis shows that lower participation of female workers and more intensive
referral hiring contribute to larger differences in the distributions of male and female workers.
The question remains how much of the empirically observed wage gap due to the glass-ceiling
effect in Germany (6.4%) can be explained by Model IV? To answer this question we take
normalised wages from table 1 and assign these wages to the three hierarchical levels in our
model, so that w0 = 1, w1 = 1.319 and w2 = 1.713. With these wages we can calculate the
average wages of male and female workers in our model:
wF = pF0 w0 + p
F
1 w1 + p
F
2 w2 = 0.4857 · 1 + 0.2830 · 1.319 + 0.2313 · 1.713 = 1.254
wM = pM0 w0 + p
M
1 w1 + p
M
2 w2 = 0.4665 · 1 + 0.2936 · 1.319 + 0.2400 · 1.713 = 1.264
The wage gap generated by Model IV is equal to 1.264/1.254− 1 = 0.008, that is 0.8%. We can
see that the gender wage gap depends on the distributions pFi , p
M
i and on the fixed wages wi,
i = 0, 1, 2. Recall that the distributions pFi , p
M
i reflect upward mobility of workers by means of
on-the-job search and internal promotions. Moreover, the spead of internal promotions depends
on the promotion time x¯. Figure 5 illustrates the relative gender wage gap (wM − wF )/wF as
a function of the promotion cut-off x¯. We vary this parameter in the range [40..60] with the
benchmark value x¯ = 50, corresponding to 12.5 years. The corresponding function is downward-
sloping, which means that earlier promotions amplify the wage difference generated by social
networks and referral hiring.
Finally, we can also see that the relative gender wage gap strongly depends on the fixed
wages wi, i = 0, 1, 2. To understand this dependence we vary the mid-level wage w1 on Figure
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Figure 5: Relative gender wage gap (wM −wF )/wF as a function of the promotion cut-off x¯ and
mid-level wage w1.
5. In particular, we consider w1 = 1.16 which is lower than the benchmark case (w1 = 1.319)
and w1 = 1.48 which is higher than the benchmark case. We can see that higher values of w1
shift the whole curve upwards and increase the gender wage gap. The relative gender wage gap
can even be larger than 1% for higher values of w1 and earlier promotions.
5 Simulation model
5.1 Introducing extensions
In order to study more deeply the mechanisms that underlie the glass ceiling effect in our
framework we extend the model in three dimensions: (a) we add one more hierarchical level
to the firms, (b) we allow for an endogenous network formation following the idea of triadic
closures, and (c) introduce gender specific promotion times.
All these three extensions follow up on our general approach to study gender inequality in
a framework that combines a labor market characterized by search and matching with a more
elaborate representation of firms’ organizational structures and hiring practices. There is ample
evidence that firms organize their hierarchies distinctively (Bloom et al., 2010). It has also been
shown that the nature of corporate hierarchies is changing (see, e.g. Rajan and Wulf, 2006;
Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010). In particular, we refer to empirical evidence by Caliendo et al.
(2015) who report that a vast majority of French firms have a hierarchical structure with up to
four distinct layers. Thus, in one extension, we introduce a third top management level. Then,
top level managers may refer their contacts for mid-level positions and for senior management
positions. In addition, we split the overall experience requirement x¯ of 50 time periods into two
parts. So that firms require 25 periods of experience for workers to be promoted from mid-level
positions to senior management and another 25 periods to become a top manager. As a result,
there are three separate markets in this extended setting. It should be interesting to see whether
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deeper hierarchical structures of firms have an effect on the gender distribution in our framework,
in particular, as we have also modeled networks among workers who may be referred when it
comes to filling a firm’s position.
The idea of triadic closures in networks in the spirit of sociologist Georg Simmel (Simmel,
1908) underlying our second extension is the following: if people A and B know each other, and
at the same time people B and C know each other, then it is very likely that A and C get to
know each other. Triadic closures seem to be a pertinent feature of real life networks. At least,
it has been shown for various social contexts that the likelihood that A and C are connected
is higher than the probability that a tie between these two is established randomly (See, e.g.,
Barabaˆsi et al., 2002; Davis et al., 2003; Holme et al., 2004; Ingram and Roberts, 2000; Newman
and Girvan, 2004; Opsahl and Panzarasa, 2009; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
Finally, modeling gender specific promotion times allows us to look into the interaction
between the network effect described above and direct discrimination via unequal promotion
rates. The extension relates to empirical evidence suggesting that women have lower promotion
probabilities (see, e.g., Cobb-Clark, 2001; Lluis, 2005; Cassidy et al., 2016). We implement
discrimination along the promotion path by setting a minimum human capital level necessary
for promotion x¯ for men that is 25% lower than that for women. This reflects evidence presented
in Cassidy et al. (2016) for Finnland, showing that women face a 25% lower probability of pro-
motion. As the average duration until promotion is the inverse of the probability of promotion,
we set x¯ for men to 18.75 and leave it for women equal to 25. Note that the three extensions are
conducted sequentially and we consider the effect of unequal promotion rates in a setting with
four hierarchical levels and triadic closures.
As these extensions occur to be intractable in an analytical framework we program an agent-
based simulation model. Introducing the agent-based approach to the analysis of labor markets
has already been proposed by Freeman (1998) some time ago. Agent-based models suit well for
the formalization of set-ups which are characterized by heterogenous interacting agents. One of
the earliest attempts to build an agent-based labor market model can be found in Bergmann
(1990). Others followed with applications that included network structures, see, e.g., by Tassier
and Menczer (2008), Stovel and Fountain (2009), Gemkow and Neugart (2011), or Dawid and
Gemkow (2013). These and other contributions are surveyed in Neugart and Richiardi (2018).
In order to lend credibility to our simulation model we show in Section 5.3 that the analytical
results can be replicated by the agent-based simulation before we present the results on the three
extensions.
5.2 Simulation code
Algorithm (1) outlines the pseudocode of the simulation model.6 In each of the 1000 iterations
the following steps are taken. Network links are established. For the baseline simulation model
that replicates the analytical results a worker meets another worker with probability φ = 0.8.
If they are of the same gender a network link is established with probability τ = 0.5 and if
they are of opposite gender a link is established with τ0 = 0.25. In the extension incorporating
triadic closures there is a probability with which two workers meet randomly, and a counter-
probability with which a particular worker meets someone from the list of contacts of one of
6The simulation code is written in Repast – a Java based platform.
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his or her own contacts. We set these probabilities to 0.5. After networks are formed, firms
promote workers who reached the human capital level x¯ for a vacancy (if there is one) on the
next hierarchical level. The human capital level x¯ is set to 50 for the model which replicates the
analytical set-up, and to 25 for the simulation model for which we add one more hierarchical
level. These human capital levels are set equal for men and women except for the extension
within which we analyze discrimination along promotional paths. Here, x¯ becomes 18.75 for
men and is left equal to 25 for women. Once the internal labor markets are closed, workers
apply with probability z1 = 0.0135 for vacancies that do not require a certain human capital
endowment, and with probability z2 = 0.2 for vacancies for which they meet the human capital
requirement, i.e. the senior and the top-level management positions. When hiring workers
firms may consider workers with a referral. Referrals can be given by supervisors on all higher
hierarchical levels. With probability s = 0.4 supervisors on the senior and top-level management
positions are invited to refer someone who is a member of their network. Next, workers’ human
capital is updated, and by the end of the iteration, jobs are destroyed at a rate ρ = 0.015 and
network links are dissolved at rate δ = 0.01. At iteration 1000 model outcomes are saved, and
what we call one run is completed. In total, we simulate 50 runs which gives us a distribution
of 50 observations for every outcome variable that we may analyze.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of simulation model
for number of runs < 51 do
for number of iterations < 1001 do
New network links are established at rate φ
Firms promote workers above x¯
Workers apply for vacancies with probability z1 (z2)
Firms hire (in)experienced worker on the external market
Update of workers’ human capital x
Jobs are destroyed at rate ρ
Network links are dissolved at rate δ
Recording of model outcomes
5.3 Results
First, we show that our simulation provides a close replication of the analytical model where
we focus on specification IV (as shown in Table 3). Figure 6 illustrates the dynamics of one
of the 50 runs showing the time series for selected variables over the 1000 iterations. At the
beginning of the iteration all positions in the firms are vacant (panel a) and no network links
exist (panel b). Eventually firms hire workers and most of the firms have both of the positions
(middle and high) filled after a while. Moreover, as time evolves network links are established.
Panel (b) illustrates that the numbers of network links in the simulation model quickly converge
to the predicted numbers of links that male workers should have with male workers (28) or with
female workers (6). The same is true for the network links of female workers. Panels (c) and (d)
show the shares of males and females on the low and high positions, respectively. Again, there
is convergence over time.
Making use of the 50 replications we can calculate the average values of some of the key
variables in the simulation model (column (E0) in Table 5) and compare them to the outcomes
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6: Time series
Notes: Times series on (a) number of firms by positions filled, (b) average number of network
links by gender and direction, (c) share of employment on low level positions by gender, and
(d) share of employment on high level positions by gender. Single run for 1000 iterations on
Model 4.
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Table 5: Employment shares by gender and hierarchical level
E0 E1 E2 E3
M F M F M F M F
low
0.462 0.485 0.432 0.464 0.426 0.480 0.395 0.463
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
middle
0.294 0.287 0.196 0.182 0.197 0.181 0.187 0.196
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
high
0.243 0.229 0.169 0.163 0.172 0.153 0.204 0.176
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
top
- - 0.203 0.192 0.206 0.186 0.215 0.165
- - (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Notes: The table shows the mean employment shares and standard errors over 50 runs by
gender and hierarchical level for the replication of the analytical model (E0), the extension to
four hierarchical levels (E1), a network formation with triadic closures (E2), and gender
specific promotion times with triadic closure (E3).
of the analytical model IV, see last columns of Table 3. The means of the outcome variables
of the simulation model with respect to the number of firms having two, one, or no vacancy,
and the shares of workers on the different jobs by gender are close to the theoretical model. In
fact, they are not different from a statistical point of view. Overall, the agent-based simulation
model produces results that match those of the analytical model. This makes us confident that
the results of any of the three extensions to which we turn now are not due to the change from
the analytical to the simulation framework.
In the next columns of Table 5 we summarize the findings of the three extensions (E1 to
E3) with respect to the employment shares by gender and hierarchical level of the firms. As we
go from three hierarchical levels to four (E1), the pattern in the employment shares remains.
Females are less represented in the top level positions and have higher employment shares on the
low level position. This is also true as we allow for a network formation in the spirit of triadic
closures (E2). As can be seen from Figure 7, the network formation where workers are more
likely to establish links with the contacts of workers whom they are already linked to changes
the distribution of links by gender. Males tend to have fewer links with females now, but more
with males. Finally, the employment pattern also remains as we add gender specific promotion
times (E3) that discriminate against women.
While these findings are already interesting from a qualitative point of view one may ask,
again, to which extent they are informative with respect to explaining gender wage differentials
in connection with a glass ceiling effect. As before we calculate average wages for men and women
based on the employment shares along the hierarchical levels of the simulation model, and the
actually paid wages to men and women on these hierarchical levels that we can observe in the
SOEP, c.f. Table 1. It turns out that the gender wage differential in the simulation model with
three hierarchies (E0) is 0.81%. Increasing the levels of hierarchy from 3 to 4 raises the gender
wage differential to 1.3% (E1). Adding triadic closures to the network increases the gender wage
differential further to 2.7% (E2), and, finally, including discrimination along the promotional
path of a firm in terms of gender-specific human capital requirements yields a gender wage gap
of 4.5%. That is, without discrimination but a network with triadic closures and deeper firm
hierarchies (E2), our simulation model captures about 42% (= 100 · 2.7/6.4) of the gender wage
28
(a) Mean = 11.6 ; Variance = 11.0 (b) Mean = 13.9 ; Variance = 13.7
(c) Mean = 5.9 ; Variance = 5.9 (d) Mean = 27.1 ; Variance = 25.8
Figure 7: Distribution of network links
Notes: Histograms show directed links per worker by gender for models E1 (4 hierarchial levels
with random network - grey bars) and E2 (4 hierarchical levels with triadic closure - black
lines). Distributions are based on workers network links at the 1000th iteration for 50 runs.
Means and variances are stated for the distributions of model E1. We calculated the global
clustering coefficients which is defined as the number of closed triplets over the number of all
triplets (both open and closed). The global clustering coefficient increases from 0.032 to 0.041
when going from model E1 to model E2.
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differential that arises empirically due to a relatively larger representation of women on lower
managerial levels.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we were interested in the extent to which the gender wage gap can be explained
by high-skilled female workers not making it to the higher managerial positions in firms. We
addressed the question by, first, setting up and analyzing an analytical model that, later on,
was accompanied by an agent-based simulation model to take into account further explanatory
factors. Our model extends the existing literature on search and matching models, networks,
and discrimination by adding more structure than can usually be found to the operation of the
firm. In particular, we model various hierarchical levels, accumulation of human capital on the
job, and referrer behavior in firms jointly. By doing so, a set of new and interesting results could
be obtained. We show that an unequal representation of women along the managerial positions
of firms may emerge without discrimination. Two requirements have to be fulfilled for this to
occur: women need to be under-represented in the labor market and network formation has to
be homophilous. If these two requirements are fulfilled, the disproportional representation of
women on top managerial positions becomes, moreover, stronger as firms have more hierarchy
levels, networks are more clustered (e.g. by triadic closures), and discrimination takes place for
promotions within firms.
Thus, part of the gender pay gap is reflected in women being under-represented in better
paying managerial jobs, and there are reasons why women do not make it to the top positions
which are not necessarily related to discrimination or occupational segregation. In fact, it may
suffice that labor market participation of women is lower than for men –which is the case in many
occupations (ILO, 2017)– and that workers are more inclined to form propfessional network links
with others of the same gender. Whether both requirements fulfilled could already be the result
of discrimination needs discussion. If, for example, lower female labor force participation is the
result of young women not investing into human capital because they are systematically kept out
of higher education in general or certain fields, as it is often observed in engineering studies or the
natural sciences, then discrimination would already have taken place before our analysis starts.
Similarly, one could rightly argue that the formation of networks along the gender-dimension
is already the result of discrimination. Men might want to form a network link with another
men rather than a women because they want to keep women out of their relevant labor market.
We would speak of discrimination here in the sense of Borjas (2013, p.367) who defines it as
something that “... occurs when participants in the marketplace take into account such factors
as race and sex when making economic exchanges.” Such a reasoning, however, would disregard
all other factors why men like to hook up more with men, and women more with women which
are orthogonal to getting a referral sometimes in the future.
In empirical terms our analysis suggests that as we observe flatter firm hierarchies in the fu-
ture (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010) also the gender wage differential should
decline. Moreover, our analysis bears some interesting policy implications. As homophilous net-
works are one driver behind the dis-proportionate gender distribution of managerial jobs, it
occurs to be advisable to establish instruments that are conducive to gender-mixing of net-
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works. Policies that encourage women’s only networks at workplaces, as can be often observed
nowadays, seem to be the wrong way to go. Our analysis also suggests that policies which suc-
cessfully raise female labor force participation to the levels of male workers will also erase wage
differentials even if network formation remains homophilous.
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Appendix
Appendix I: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
In this subsection, we perform the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of wage differences between
men and women in Germany. The data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel, wave
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2013. We restrict our attention to full-time employed high skill men and women with more than
13 years of schooling. This sample includes 2403 observations with 1446 observations for men
and 957 observations for women. The average monthly gross salary of men is equal to 8.36 in
logarithmic terms, while the average salary of women is equal to 8.05. This reveals a gender wage
gap equal to 31%. We decompose this difference by using a triple Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
according to the following equation:
Wage gap = E[YM ]− E[Y F ] = E[XM ]′βM − E[XF ]′βF
= (E[XM ]′ − E[XF ]′)βF︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endowment effect
+E[XF ]′(βM − βF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coefficient effect
+ (E[XM ]′ − E[XF ]′)(βM − βF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interaction effect
with YM and YF as male and female wages, respectively. X is a vector of explanatory variables
that includes information on education, age, tenure, migration background, industry, size of the
firm, location with respect to East or West Germany, and hierarchical position in the firm. βF
and βM are the vectors of estimated coefficients. The first term in the decomposition is the
“Endowment effect”. It shows which part of the wage gap can be explained by between-group
differences in the observable characteristics. The second term is the “Coefficient effect”. It
shows which part of the wage gap can be explained by different pricing of female and male
characteristics in the market. The last effect shows the interaction between the endowment
and the coefficient effects. Our decomposition results are summarised in Table 6. We can see
that 16.4% of the total wage gap equal to 31% is explained by differences in the observable
characteristics of men and women. The second column of Table 7 shows the contribution of
every explanatory variable k to the total endowment effect (E[XMk ] − E[XFk ])βFk . We can see
that differences in the hierarchical levels between the two gender groups explain 6.4% out of the
endowment effect equal to 16.4%. We interpret this 6.4% difference as the glass-ceiling effect.
Table 6: Summary of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Gender wage gap Endowments Coefficients Interaction
0.3078*** 0.1642*** 0.1741*** -0.0306*
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Table 7: Regression results of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
N=2403 (1) (2) (3) (4)
LNincome Endowments Coefficients Interaction
Male 0.154***
(8.76)
Level 0.196*** -0.0639*** -0.0700 0.0117
(18.17) (-8.07) (-1.68) (1.65)
Education 0.0746*** -0.00711 0.104 -0.000646
(16.61) (-1.24) (0.71) (-0.61)
Age 0.0634*** -0.187*** -1.058 0.0581
(10.90) (-4.69) (-1.84) (1.74)
Age2 -0.000605*** 0.149*** 0.440 -0.0420
(-9.31) (4.38) (1.39) (-1.34)
Tenure 0.00518*** -0.00374 0.0596* -0.00522
(4.84) (-1.76) (2.05) (-1.62)
Native 0.0813 0.000278 0.183 0.00180
(1.58) (0.45) (1.69) (1.11)
Agriculture – 0.00224 -0.000297 0.000175
(1.77) (-0.11) (0.11)
Energy 0.307** -0.0000435 0.00269 -0.00150
(2.90) (-0.06) (0.96) (-0.89)
Mining 0.831*** -0.000620 -0.000190 0.0000945
(3.85) (-0.63) (-0.22) (0.21)
Manufacturing 0.250** 0.000715 0.00219 -0.000845
(3.13) (0.30) (0.18) (-0.18)
Construction 0.325*** -0.00605 -0.00459 0.00299
(4.02) (-1.64) (-0.39) (0.39)
Trade -0.0573 -0.00308 -0.00189 -0.000327
(-0.69) (-0.98) (-0.37) (-0.35)
Transportation 0.192* 0.000593 -0.00104 0.000229
(2.20) (0.83) (-0.25) (0.24)
Banking 0.300*** -0.000737 0.00141 -0.000474
(3.56) (-0.66) (0.23) (-0.23)
Services 0.179* -0.0150* 0.00189 0.000738
(2.32) (-2.25) (0.06) (0.06)
Firmsize ≤ 5 – -0.000602 0.00144 0.0000767
(-0.34) (0.36) (0.25)
5 < Firmsize ≤ 10 0.167*** 0.000670 -0.00551 -0.00128
(3.63) (0.90) (-1.66) (-1.00)
10 < Firmsize ≤ 20 0.160*** -0.000604 0.00128 0.000958
(3.53) (-0.39) (0.45) (0.44)
20 < Firmsize ≤ 100 0.136*** -0.000705 -0.000136 -0.0000197
(3.65) (-0.91) (-0.02) (-0.02)
100 < Firmsize ≤ 200 0.192*** 0.0000718 0.00330 0.000182
(4.58) (0.30) (0.73) (0.35)
200 < Firmsize ≤ 2000 0.191*** -0.000289 0.00466 -0.000269
(5.29) (-0.59) (0.54) (-0.45)
2000 < Firmsize 0.280*** -0.00813** 0.000196 -0.0000384
(7.88) (-2.99) (0.02) (-0.02)
West 0.231*** -0.0200*** -0.0652* 0.00616
(11.73) (-3.82) (-2.06) (1.84)
Constant 4.362***
(26.41)
Adj. R2 0.4662
Data source: SOEP (2013). Sample is restricted to high-skill full-time employees. t statistics in parentheses, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Appendix II: Solution to differential equations
We consider the system of differential equations for female workers d˙F0, d˙
N
FF and d˙
N
FM , first.
The coefficient matrix and the characteristic equation for r are given by: −(ρ+ q2) ρ ρq2(1− α2) −2ρ 0
q2α2 0 −2ρ

(−ρ− q2 − r)(−2ρ− r)(−2ρ− r)− ρq2(1− α2)(−2ρ− r)− ρq2α2(−2ρ− r) = 0
The first eigenvalue is given by r1 = −2ρ. The remaining quadratic term is:
r2 + r(q2 + 3ρ) + 2ρ
2 + 2ρq2 − ρq2 = 0
The discriminant of this quadratic equation is (q2 + ρ)
2, so the second and the third eigenvalues
are given by r2 = −ρ, r3 = −(q2 + 2ρ). The corresponding three eigenvectors are given by: 01
−1


ρ2
q2
ρ(1− α2)
ρα2

 −q2q2(1− α2)
q2α2

The general solution is given by:
dF0(x) = k
F
2
ρ2
q2
e−ρx − kF3 q2e−(2ρ+q2)x
dNFF (x) = k
F
1 e
−2ρx + kF2 ρ(1− α2)e−ρx + kF3 q2(1− α2)e−(2ρ+q2)x
dNFM (x) = −kF1 e−2ρx + kF2 ρα2e−ρx + kF3 q2α2e−(2ρ+q2)x
The three constant terms kF1 , k
F
2 and k
F
3 can be found from the following initial conditions:
q1(1− α1)d00 = dF0(0), q¯FF1 d0F = dNFF (0) and q¯FM1 d0M = dNFM (0):
dF0(0) = k
F
2
ρ2
q2
− kF3 q2 = q1(1− α1)d00
dNFF (0) = k
F
1 + k
F
2 ρ(1− α2) + kF3 q2(1− α2) = q¯FF1 d0F
dNFM (0) = −kF1 + kF2 ρα2 + kF3 q2α2 = q¯FM1 d0M
Adding the latter two equations we can express kF3 q2 = q¯
FF
1 d0F + q¯
FM
1 d0M−kF2 ρ. Then inserting
it into the first equation we get:
kF2 =
q2
ρ(ρ+ q2)
[
q1(1− α1)d00 + q¯FF1 d0F + q¯FM1 d0M
]
kF3 =
ρ
q2(ρ+ q2)
[
q¯FF1 d0F + q¯
FM
1 d0M
]
− q1(1− α1)
ρ+ q2
d00
kF1 = α2q¯
FF
1 d0F − (1− α2)q¯FM1 d0M
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Integrating dF0(x) over x in the interval [0..x¯] we get the total stock of firms dF0:
dF0 =
∫ x¯
0
[
kF2
ρ2
q2
e−ρx − kF3 q2e−(2ρ+q2)x
]
dx =
kF2 ρ
q2
(1− e−ρx¯)− k
F
3 q2
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯)
Integrating dNFF (x) over x in the interval [0..x¯] we get the total stock of firms d
N
FF :
dNFF =
∫ x¯
0
[
kF1 e
−2ρx + kF2 ρ(1− α2)e−ρx + kF3 q2(1− α2)e−(2ρ+q2)x
]
dx
=
kF1
2ρ
(1− e−2ρx¯) + kF2 (1− α2)(1− e−ρx¯) +
kF3 q2(1− α2)
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯)
Integrating dNFM (x) over x in the interval [0..x¯] we get the total stock of firms d
N
FM :
dNFM =
∫ x¯
0
[
−kF1 e−2ρx + kF2 ρα2e−ρx + kF3 q2α2e−(2ρ+q2)x
]
dx
= −k
F
1
2ρ
(1− e−2ρx¯) + kF2 α2(1− e−ρx¯) +
kF3 q2α2
2ρ+ q2
(1− e−(2ρ+q2)x¯)
Next we consider the system of differential equations for male workers d˙M0, d˙
N
MM and d˙
N
MF . The
coefficient matrix is given by:  −(ρ+ q2) ρ ρq2α2 −2ρ 0
q2(1− α2) 0 −2ρ

The eigenvalues are the same, but the eigenvectors are slightly different and given by: 01
−1


ρ2
q2
ρα2
ρ(1− α2)

 −q2q2α2
q2(1− α2)

So the general solution becomes:
dM0(x) = k
M
2
ρ2
q2
e−ρx − kM3 q2e−(2ρ+q2)x
dNMM (x) = k
M
1 e
−2ρx + kM2 ρα2e
−ρx + kM3 q2α2e
−(2ρ+q2)x
dNMF (x) = −kM1 e−2ρx + kM2 ρ(1− α2)e−ρx + kM3 q2(1− α2)e−(2ρ+q2)x
The initial conditions are: q1α1d00 = dM0(0), q¯
MM
1 d0M = d
N
MM (0) and q¯
MF
1 d0F = d
N
MF (0). So
we find the three constant terms kM1 , k
M
2 and k
M
3 from the following system of equations:
dM0(0) = k
M
2
ρ2
q2
− kM3 q2 = q1α1d00
dNMM (0) = k
M
1 + k
M
2 ρα2 + k
M
3 q2α2 = q¯
MM
1 d0M
dNMF (0) = −kM1 + kM2 ρ(1− α2) + kM3 q2(1− α2) = q¯MF1 d0F
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Adding the latter two equations we can express kM3 q2 = q¯
MM
1 d0M + q¯
MF
1 d0F − kM2 ρ. Then
inserting it into the first equation we get:
kM2 =
q2
ρ(ρ+ q2)
[
q1α1d00 + q¯
MM
1 d0M + q¯
MF
1 d0F
]
kM3 =
ρ
q2(ρ+ q2)
[
q¯MM1 d0M + q¯
MF
1 d0F
]
− q1α1
ρ+ q2
d00
kM1 = (1− α2)q¯MM1 d0M − α2q¯MF1 d0F
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